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Scienter as an Element in SEC
Enforcement Actions
I.

Introduction
In recent years section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934'
and rule 1Ob-5 2 promulgated thereunder have become one of the most
frequently litigated areas of securities law. Both the statutory section and
the rule deal with fraudulent and misleading practices in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities.' Litigation under section 10(b) and rule
l0b-5 has generally arisen from enforcement actions instituted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission 4 and from private actions for damages. 5
While both private plaintiffs and the SEC must base their actions
upon the same statutory language, each approaches such litigation from a
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as 1934 Act].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
3. The pertinent language of the statute provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Rule lob-5, promulgated by the SEC in 1942, provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] was established
under Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1970). Prior to
passage of this Act, authority to regulate securities was vested in the Federal Trade
Commission. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(5), 48 Stat. 75 (1933) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77b(5) (1970)). For purposes of this comment, suits brought by the SEC to enjoin
violations of the securities laws will be termed enforcement actions.
5. Neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 specifically authorizes a private cause of
action, but courts have recognized that private plaintiffs have an implied right to recover
monetary damages. See notes 96-99 and accompanying text infra.
For purposes of this comment, civil suits to recover monetary damages will be termed
private damages actions.

different perspective. In seeking monetary damages on his own behalf,
the private plaintiff looks to the federal courts to provide restitution for
past lOb-5 violations. The SEC, on the other hand, seeks to protect the
investing public from fraudulent or deceptive practices by enjoining
continued or threatened 1Ob-5 violations. Consequently, courts have
purported to distinguish private damages actions from enforcement actions with respect to the plaintiff's burden of proof. 6 They have not
7
always been successful.
One of the most unsettled areas in rule 1Ob-5 litigation is the
necessity of establishing scienter on the part of the defendant. In Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,8 a private damages action brought under rule 1Ob-5,
the Supreme Court has seemingly put to rest considerable confusion
among the circuit courts9 by requiring a private plaintiff to plead and
prove scienter as an element of his burden of proof under rule lOb-5.
While the Court specifically left unresolved the applicability of a scienter
requirement to enforcement actions,10 more than one court has extended
the Supreme Court's analysis in Hochfelder to require that the SEC
1
establish scienter as part of its burden of proof in enforcement actions. I
Other courts, emphasizing the inherent differences between private dam6. The characteristics, purposes, and requirements of private damages actions
brought under a federal regulatory statute have often been judicially contrasted with
remedial actions brought by the statutory enforcement agency. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321 (1944); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1053 (1977); FTC v. Rhodes, 191 F.2d 744(7th Cir. 1951); SECv. Petrofunds, Inc., 420
F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1974). In denying the SEC's injunction, the court relied on the Second Circuit's decision in
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), a private damages action under rule
lob-5, to require the SEC to make a similar showing of scienter in an enforcement action.
The case has been criticized for unnecessarily confusing the traditional distinctions between
private suits and enforcement actions. See 18 HOWARD L.J. 854 (1975).
8. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
9. Prior to the Hochfelder decision a sharp conflict existed among the circuit courts
regarding the standard of liability in private suits under rule lOb-5. The Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits did not require a scienter standard, holding some form of traditional negligence sufficient to establish civil liability. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1974); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus. Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973); City Nat'l
Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). The
remaining circuits have adopted some form of a scienter standard. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk,
507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (scienter or conscious fault
necessary); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1974) (dictum); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974)(mere negligence
insufficient for civil liability); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 414 U.S. 857 (1973) (no liability for "mere negligence"); Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (plaintiff must show
fraudulent misrepresentation); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md.
1972), rev 'd in part on othergrounds, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916
(1974).
10. "Since this case concerns an action for damages we also need not consider the
question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under §
10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
11. SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977); SEC v. Bausch
& Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See notes 91-105 and accompanying text
infra.

ages actions2 and enforcement actions, have expressly rejected such an
extension. 1
This comment will examine the propriety of a scienter standard in
enforcement actions. First, the statutory remedies available to the SEC as
part of its enforcement powers will be examined. 13 Second, the effect of
the Hochfelder decision on the statutory and judicial requirements for an
enforcement action will be explored by analyzing the case law development of the meaning and applicability of a scienter standard before and
after Hochfelder.14 Last, public policy considerations will be scrutinized
15
to determine the proper role of scienter in enforcement actions.
H.

The Nature of SEC's Enforcement Role

A.

The Remedies Available

The SEC is vested with the administrative responsibility of enforcing
the various securities laws. 16 Upon receipt of investor complaints, 7 the
SEC is specifically empowered 18 to conduct a formal investigation.' 9 If

the results of the investigation disclose that a securities law violation has
taken place, the SEC may choose from an imposing array of remedial
measures. The enforcement options available to the SEC can be grouped
into four procedural categories: (1) summary actions under specific statutory authority; (2) criminal referrals to the Justice Department; (3) administrative enforcement proceedings; and (4) enforcement actions
brought in a United States district court. In carrying out its enforcement
12. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Geotek Resources Fund, Inc., 426
F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). See notes 106-11 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 16-60 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 61-126 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 127-150 and accompanying text infra.
16. The SEC is generally responsible for the enforcement of the following statutes
[hereinafter collectively referred to as securities laws] dealing with the regulation of securities or securities-related industries and individuals: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77hh (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-b (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-l to -52 (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1970).
17. The SEC receives a large volume of investor complaints each year. Most complaints deal with operational problems, such as mishandling of accounts or failure to deliver
securities or funds promptly by broker-dealers, and are usually resolved through SEC staff
inquiries. In 1976 approximately 16,300 complaints were received, of which 5,300 were
complaints against broker-dealers and 11,000 related to issuers, investment advisers, mutual
funds, or related matters. 42 SEC ANN. REP. 107 (1976).
18. The SEC is granted specific authority to conduct formal investigations under each
of the six securities laws. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1970); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, § 321(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §
18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 79r(a) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 42(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a41(a) (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1970).
19. Investigations are usually conducted confidentially by the SEC's regional offices
unless proceedings are brought before the Commission as a matter of public record. In 1976
a total of 413 such investigations were opened. 42 SEC ANN. REP. 108 (1976).

responsibilities, the SEC has complete discretion in choosing among
these remedies and may pursue several different remedies successively. 20
1. Summary Actions.-Under certain SEC regulations 21 permitting exemption from the full registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 193322 the SEC may temporarily suspend the exemption pending a
hearing to determine whether such a suspension should be made permanent. 23 Unless subsequently modified, the effect of such a suspension is
to permanently disqualify the issuer, underwriter, and principals of the
exempted issuer from invoking the exemption in future offerings. 24 Similarly, under the Securities Exchange Act of 193425 the SEC has broad
powers 26 to oversee the operation of national securities exchanges, overthe-counter markets, and self regulatory associations of these exchanges
and markets. Thus, if it finds that such actions are in the public interest,
the SEC may summarily suspend an issuer's over-the-counter or exchange trading. 27 In addition, the SEC may summarily revoke the registration of a self regulatory association and censure or place limits on its
activities. 28
2. Criminal Referrals.-Under each of the securities laws,29 the
SEC may refer its files to the Department of Justice with a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 30 If a willful 3 1 violation has oc20. See A.G. Bellin Securities Corp., 39 S.E.C. 178 (1959)(enforcement actions and
administrative suspension proceeding may be instituted successively).
21. For example, the Commission's "Regulation A" provides an exemption from
registration for certain domestic and Canadian issuers when the dollar amount of the
offering does not exceed $500,000. Unlike other types of exemptions, however, regulation A
requires the filing and processing of a notification statement with the appropriate SEC
Regional Office, and the issuer must use an Offering Circular containing basic disclosure
information in selling the securities. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1976).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
23. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.261 (1976)(relating to suspension of exemption pursuant to
regulation A); id. §§ 230.334-.338 (relating to suspension of exemption pursuant to regulation B).
24. See id. § 230.252(c)-(e) (1976).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
26. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15, 17, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o,
78q, 78s (Supp. 1975).
27. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15(c)(5) and 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§
78o(c)(5) and 78s(h) (Supp. 1975).
28.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (Supp. 1975).
29. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Trust Indenture Act of
1939, 321(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d) (Supp. 1975); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. §
79r(f) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(e) (1970);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970).
30. In fiscal 1976, 116 cases were referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution, resulting in 97 convictions. 42 SEC ANN. REP. 206 (1976).
31. Because of the serious consequences following from a criminal conviction, each
of the securities laws mandates that the defendant's conduct must amount to a "willful
violation." Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
§ 325, 15 U.S.C. § 77yyy (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff
(1970); Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-3 (1970); Investment
Company Act of 1940, §§ 37, 49, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-36, 80a-48 (1970); Investment Advisers

32
curred, the defendant is subject to both fines and imprisonment.

3. Administrative Enforcement Proceedings.-Administrative enforcement proceedings are generally initiated by allegations of securities
law violations by brokerage firms, dealers, or other persons engaged in
the securities business. If the SEC determines from these proceedings that
a willful 33 violation has occurred and that a sanction is in the public

34
interest, it may revoke, suspend, or deny registration of a broker-dealer
or investment adviser 35 or censure or limit the activity of any person
associated with a broker-dealer. 36 Administrative enforcement proceed37
ings also deal with the adequacy of disclosure in registration statements
38
and reports required to be filed with the SEC. These proceedings may
result in a "stop order" suspending effectiveness of registration, 39 or an
40
order directing compliance with the applicable reporting requirements.

4. Enforcement Actions. -The enforcement action to enjoin securities law violations is the most common remedial measure employed by
Act of 1940, § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1970). While it is unnecessary to show that the
defendant had the specific intent to violate the law, it must at least be shown that the
defendant understood his actions and purposefully performed the acts that objectively
constitute the violation. See generally James, Culpability Predicates for Federal Securities
Law Sanctions: The Present Law and the Proposed Federal Securites Code, 12 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1 (1974).
32. Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970) ($5,000 fine and/or 5 years'
imprisonment); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 325, 15 U.S.C. § 77yyy (1970) ($5,000 fine
and/or 5 years' imprisonment); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff
(1970) (maximum fine of $500,000 for an exchange; $10,000 fine and/or 2 years' imprisonment
for others); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-3
(1970) (maximum fine of $200,000 for a public utility holding company, $10,000 fine and/or 2
years' imprisonment for others); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 49, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48
(1970) ($10,000 fine and/or 2 years' imprisonment); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 217,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1970)($10,000 fine and/or 2 years' imprisonment).
33. "Willful violation" is generally required as the standard of proof for the imposition of administrative sanctions. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(b), 8(a),
15(b)(5)(A), (D), and (E), 15(b)(7), and 15A(1)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), h(a), o(b)(5)(A),
(D), and (E), o(b)(7) and o-3(1)(2)(B) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, §§ 17(h) and
(i), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(h) and (i) (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 203(e)(1) and
(4), 203(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e)(1) and (4), 80b-3(f) (1970). See generally James, note 31
supra.
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(5), 15 U.S.. § 78o(b)4 (Supp. 1975).
35. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1970).
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (Supp. 1975).
37. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires the filing of a registration statement with the SEC prior to any offers or sales of securities in interstate commerce. 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
38. Sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act require issuers of securities registered under
the 1933 Act or pursuant to Section 12 of the 1934 Act to file such reports as the SEC may
prescribe. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, o(d) (1970). Pursuant to this authority the SEC by regulation
requires (1) periodic reports to keep information on file with the SEC up to date, see 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 1, 240.15d-11 (1976); (2) annual reports, see id. § 240.13a-1,240.15d-1;
(3) quarterly reports, see id. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13; and (4) other reports reflecting
changed circumstances of the issuer, see, e.g., id. §§ 240.13a-10, 240.15d-10.
39. Securities Act of 1933, § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1970).

the SEC in rule lOb-5 violations. 4 ' Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act authorizes the SEC to seek injunctive relief in the appropriate federal district
court whenever it appears that any person is engaged in, or about to
engage in, securities laws violations. 42 Injunctive relief attained in an
enforcement action has definite advantages over alternative enforcement
options. It provides swift, decisive relief upon a prima facie showing of
43
activity injurious to public investors.
Moreover, once the equity jurisdiction of the court attaches, various
forms of ancillary relief' may be granted under the traditionally inherent
equity powers of the federal district courts. 45 In recent years the SEC has
frequently requested and obtained increasingly varied forms of ancillary
relief in rule lOb-5 enforcement actions. 46 Thus, enforcement actions
have resulted in (1) appointment of equity receivers for businesses when
investors were likely to be harmed by continuance of the existing management, 47 (2) disgorgement of wrongfully-obtained profits,4 8 (3) ap41. During fiscal 1976 the SEC instituted 158 enforcement actions in the United States
district courts. 42 SEC ANN. REP. 206 (1976).
42. Section 21(d) states in part as follows:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about
to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this
chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of a national securities
exchange or registered securities association of which such person is a member or
a person associated with a member, the rules of a registered clearing agency in
which such person is a participant, or the rules of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district
court of the United States. . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. 1977).
43. To obtain preliminary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction, the SEC must show only that defendant's conduct constitutes a
securities statute violation and that there is a reasonable likelihood that such violations will
be repeated. See notes 53-60 and accompanying text infra.
44. Ancillary relief for securities law purposes can be characterized as an extrastatutory remedy imposed by an equity court to insure meaningful enforcement of its
injunction decree.
45. Ancillary relief is granted under the traditional power of an equity court to
implement its injunctive decrees, as well as the power of federal courts to formulate federal
common law to effect statutory policy. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Although not specifically authorized by any of the securities laws, application of ancillary
relief in enforcement actions is well established. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 3
(1970); American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973).
46. For a general discussion of the expanding trend of the SEC to request, and equity
courts to grant, increasingly varied forms of ancillary relief, see Mathews, Recent Trends in
SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323 (1976);
Sporkin, SEC Developments Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAW. 121
(Special Issue, 1974); Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques: Expanding and Exotic
Forms of Ancillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 637 (1975); Comment, Court-Appointed
Directors:Ancillary Relief in FederalSecuritiesLaw Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737
(1976); Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule lOb-5, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 656 (1966); Comment, EquitableRemedies in SECEnforcement Actions, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1188 (1975).
47. See, e.g., SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Keller Corp., 323
F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1971). While appointment of receivers in securities

pointment of independent boards of directors for corporate defendants, 49
and (4) imposition of additional disclosure
requirements above those
5
already mandated in the securites laws. 0
Another advantage of the enforcement action is its tendency to
induce a prompt, negotiated settlement evidenced by a consent decree
between the SEC and the potential defendant. In a consent decree, the
defendant and the SEC execute a "Stipulation and Consent to Final
Judgment of Permanent Injunction" whereby defendant, usually without
admitting or denying the allegations made by the SEC regarding the
unlawful nature of his prior activity, 51 agrees to refrain from similar
activity in the future and/or to amend his conduct so as to comply with the
provisions of the securities laws. The agreement is then presented to the
court, which enters a judicial decree after satisfying itself that the settle52
ment is equitable and affords adequate public protection.
The consent decree process is a virtual necessity for the SEC, since it
has neither the time nor the resources to litigate each complaint to its
ultimate judicial conclusion. Each party derives substantial benefit from
negotiating a consent decree. By obtaining the decree, the SEC has
served the public interest by bringing the allegedly violative conduct to a
litigation has been effected for the most part through judicial initiative, section 42(e) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 specifically authorizes appointment of a receiver. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-41(c) (1970).
48. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Penn
Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc.,
410 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1249
(D.D.C. 1975).
49. See, e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 5 SEC DOCKET 241 (Sec. Lit. Rel. No. 6531)(C.D.
Cal. Oct. 2, 1974)(company required to maintain board of directors in which majority is
selected by the SEC with court approval); SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 2 SEC DOCKET
451 (Sec. Lit. Rel. No. 6054) (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 1973) (six independent directors appointed
to an enlarged board of 13). See generally Comment, Court-AppointedDirectors:Ancillary
Relief in FederalSecurities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737 (1976).
50. See, e.g., SEC v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 9 SEC DOCKET 1074 (Sec. Lit. Rel.
No. 7479)(D.D.C. July 7, 1976)(company required to complete investigation by its Audit
Committee and submit final written report); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1973)(written guidelines for distribution of financial information to investors).
51. The usual language of the Stipulation and Consent, making clear that no statutory
violation has been proven, states as follows:
This Stipulation and Consent is entered into solely for the purpose of settlement
of this action, without trial or argument of any issue of fact or law. Neither this
Stipulation and Consent, nor the entry of judgment herein in accordance with the
Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction in the form annexed hereto, shall constitute any evidence or any admission or any adjudication with respect to any
allegation of the Commission's complaint or any fact or conclusion of law with
respect to any matter alleged in or arising out of the Commission's complaint, or
of any wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of [the defendant].
Treadway, supra note 46, at 639 n. 15.
52. The role of the court in the consent decree process is to provide a judicial check on
the administrative action of the SEC in agreeing to the terms of the consent settlement.
Once entered, the consent decree is binding on the parties and can be appealed only on the
grounds of fraud, lack of actual consent of a party, or lack of subject matter jurisdiction of
the approving court. See generally SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1380 (D.
Colo. 1970), aff'd, 464 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973); United
States v. Carter Prod. Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).

halt. At the same time, the defendant has averted the expense of extended
litigation and the accompanying damaging publicity.
Because it is specifically a statutory remedy, 53 an enforcement
action is not subject to all the equitable requirements necessary to sustain
a private suit for injunctive relief. 54 The SEC need only establish that the
defendant has committed, or is about to commit a violation of the
securities laws, and that certain traditional notions of equity do not weigh
against imposition of an injunction. 5 Thus, the SEC need not sustain the
57
burden of showing inadequacy of legal remedies,56 irreparable injury,
or continuing violation. 58 Nevertheless, the federal district courts retain
wide discretion in weighing other equitable factors relating to the likelihood of future violations. 59 Unless the SEC can demonstrate that past
violations are reasonably likely to be repeated, an injunction will be
denied, despite the prima facie showing of securities law violations
6°
required by statute.
III.
A.

Scienter as an Enforcement Action Requirement
Prior to Hochfelder

One of the elements 6 1 most frequently considered by courts in
determining the reasonable likelihood of future violations is the degree of
53. Each of the securities laws authorizes the SEC to seek injunctive relief in the
appropriate district court. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, § 321(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. 1975); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §
18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 79r(f) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a42(e) (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970).
54. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
55. See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir. 1968); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
56. Bradford v. SEC, 278 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1960); Walling v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.,
129 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1946); SEC v. Jones, 85 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581
(1936).
57. SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937); SEC v. R.J. Allen Assocs., 386 F. Supp.
866 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consolidated Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248
(D. Utah 1958).
58. United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939);
SEC v. Dot, 302 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
59. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
60. See, e.g., SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
61. Other factors generally considered by courts in measuring the likelihood of future
violations include the following: (1) the isolated or recurrent nature of the violation, see,
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); (2) the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature
of his conduct, see e.g., SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 972 (1970); (3) the defendant's voluntary cessation of such activity, see, e.g., SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); (4) the sincerity of assurances
that no future violations will occur, see, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mkting Corp., 402 F.
Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975); and (5) the defendant's occupational opportunity for further
violation, see, e.g., SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
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scienter in the defendant's past activity. The term scienter in securities
litigation has defied precise definition. One commentator observes that
"scienter . . . has been variously defined to mean everything from
knowing falsity with an implication of mens rea, through the various
gradations of recklessness, down to such non-action as is virtually equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault . . . ."62 Generally,
courts have agreed that common law intent to defraud need not be shown
in private damages actions, holding that some form of personal knowledge of the misrepresentations or omission beyond mere negligence is
sufficient. 63
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,64 courts almost unanimously regarded ordinary negligence as a
sufficient standard of liability in an enforcement action. 65 Even circuits
that required a scienter standard in private damages actions distinguished
the enforcement action as a statutory form of remedial action for which a
scienter requirement is inappropriate.6 These holdings have been based
on two grounds.
First, the inherent purposes underlying enforcement actions and
private damages actions are clearly distinguishable. In private damages
actions, the plaintiff/victim seeks personal monetary redress of past
statutory violations. In enforcement actions, the SEC seeks injunctive
protection for the public against future violations. Thus, while a stricter
scienter standard may be justified when the recovery sought is of a
compensatory or punitive nature, courts have refused to apply such a
standard to the milder "prophylactic relief" sought in an enforcement
action. 67
Second, courts have used a public policy rationale to uphold a more
flexible standard of liability in enforcement actions. The entire thrust of
the securities laws is the protection of the economic public interest
through disclosure requirements designed to enable public investors to
62.
63.

3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1432 (2d Ed. 1961).
See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.

1007 (1975)(scienter or conscious fault beyond mere negligence); Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)(actual knowledge

of falsity). Material misrepresentations or omissions made in reckless disregard of the truth
have also been found sufficient in private suits. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d

1277 (2d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the judicial meaning of the scienter requirement, see
notes 127-39 and accompanying text infra.
64. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
65. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d cir. 1975); SEC v.
Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970). But
see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1974).
66. Compare Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973)(actual knowledge
or willful disregard for the truth necessary in private suit) with SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d

1301 (2d Cir. 1974) (scienter standard not relevant in enforcement actions).
67. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976

(1969).

make investment decisions based upon all material information. Because
the investing public can be harmed just as much from negligent violations
as from violations that entail scienter, courts have adopted a less restrictive standard of liability in enforcement actions to further the intended
68
remedial purposes of the securities statutes.
B.

The Hochfelder Case

The interpretive analysis used by the Supreme Court in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder69 casts considerable doubt on the vitality of the
traditional justifications for a negligence standard of liability in enforcement actions. In Hochfelder, the plaintiffs, regular brokerage clients of
First Securities Company of Chicago, brought a private suit under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 against the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, which
had been retained by First Securities from 1946 to 1967 to audit its books
and to file certain annual reports with the SEC pursuant to section 17(a) of
the 1934 Act.7° For approximately twenty-six years plaintiffs had invested in "private escrow accounts" 7 1 set up by Leston B. Nay, president and
92% shareholder of First Securities. In 1968 Nay committed suicide,
leaving a note in which he admitted that no such accounts existed, and
that he had converted the plaintiffs' funds to his own use. Among other
legal actions, 7 2 plaintiffs brought suit against Ernst & Ernst, alleging that
the accounting firm's negligence 73 in failing to use adequate auditing
procedures 74 to uncover Nay's fraudulent conduct constituted violations
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
In an unreported opinion the district court granted summary judgment to Ernst & Ernst. The court of appeals reversed the lower court,
68. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
69. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
70. Section 17(a) requires that securities brokers or dealers "make such reports, as the
Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970). Under rule 17a5 in effect during the period under litigation, First Securities was required to file an annual
report of its financial condition, accompanied by an accountant's statement that the financial audit was conducted in accordance with "generally accepted auditing standards applicable in the circumstances." 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1976).
71. Plaintiffs were induced to invest in the private escrow accounts by personal
assurances from Nay of a high interest yield on all moneys deposited. All deposits were to
be made by personal checks payable to a designated bank for Nay's account and mailed
directly to Nay, who would then allocate them to the proper escrow account. Similarly, Nay
made direct interest payments to plaintiffs at periodic intervals.
72. Plaintiffs also brought suits against the Midwest Stock Exchange alleging that
through its acts and omissions the Exchange had aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary
judgment for the Exchange was affirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 875 (1974).
73. Plaintiffs specifically disclaimed any intentional misconduct or fraud on the part
of Ernst & Ernst, alleging only "inexcusable negligence." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 190 (1976).
74. Specifically, plaintiffs charged that proper auditing practices would have uncovered Nay's private "mail rule," whereby all contributions to the escrow accounts mailed
to Nay's attention were not to be handled by anyone else at First Securities-even during
Nay's absence on vacations. Discovery of the "mail rule" would have prompted investigation into the fraudulent escrow accounts.

ruling that the accounting firm was liable under rule 1Ob-5 for negligently
aiding and abetting Nay's fraudulent scheme. 75 In reversing the appeals
court judgment against Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court laid to rest the
controversy among circuit courts76 by squarely holding that proof of
ordinary negligence is insufficient to establish liability in a private action
for damages under rule 1Ob-5. 7 The Court used a four part analysis in
reaching its decision.
First, the Court looked to the statutory language of section 10(b). In
particular, the Court examined dictionary definitions 78 of such lOb-5
language as "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" to demonstrate that each of these key terms comprehends a form of deliberate,
knowing conduct. From the statutory inclusion of such terms evidencing
an underlying purposeful intent, the Court concluded that the intent of
Congress in choosing such language was "unmistakable" in proscribing
79
a type of conduct "quite different from negligence."
Second, the Court examined the legislative history of section 10(b)
to support its conclusion that the statutory language was addressed to
practices that reveal some element of scienter. The Court quoted at length
statements made in congressional hearings and reports by spokesmen for
the drafters of the 1934 Act."° From these statements the Court concluded
that the overall congressional intent was to create a "catch-all" basis for
8
private damage suits based on manipulative and deceptive practices. 1
Since this legislative history revealed no specific indication of congres75. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
76. See note 9 supra.
77. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
78. The Court used the 1934 edition of Webster's International Dictionary to define
these terms as follows:
device-"[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an invention; project; scheme often, a scheme to deceive ....
"
contrive-"[t]o devise; to plan; to plot ...
invent . . . to scheme ....
manipulate--to manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate accounts ....
"
Id. at 199 nn.20-21 (1976).
79. Id. at 199 (1976).
80. The Court quoted the following statements as an indication of the legislative intent
underlying Section 10(b):
Of course subsection (c) [and 10(b) when enacted] is a catchall clause to prevent
manipulative devices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of clause.
The Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative
devices.
Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran),
quoted in 425 U.S. at 202-03.
[Tihe bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a
security, or who induces transactions in a security by means of false or misleading
statements . . . shall be liable in damages to those who have bought or sold the
security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In such case the burden
is on the plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the statement was false of
misleading, and that he relied thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape

liability by showing that the statement was made in good faith. [emphasis supplied
by the Court]
S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934), quoted in 425 U.S. at 205-06.
81. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207 (1976).

sional intent to impose liability for illicit practices based on good faith,
the Court determined that the statutory language should not be judicially
interpreted more broadly82
Third, the Court compared the language of section 10(b) with other
sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts that impose civil liability on securities
law violators.8 3 In each of these sections there is a clear indication
whether civil liability is to be imposed for "knowing or intentional
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake. "84 Moreover, in each
section in which a negligence standard of liability is clearly intended,
certain procedural restrictions are grafted into the statutory remedy. 85 No
such procedural restrictions impair section 10(b) actions; consequently,
the Court concluded that the judicially created private damages action
86
under section 10(b) could not be based on negligent wrongdoing.
Last, the Court examined rule 1Ob-5 in light of the analysis used for
section 10(b). Since neither the plain language nor the legislative history
of section 10(b) was found to support a less than scienter standard of
liability, and since the scope of rule 10b-5 is limited by the statutory
section pursuant to which it is promulgated, the Court concluded that
application of rule I Ob-5 is limited to behavior that includes some degree
of scienter.

87

An interpretation of the effect of the Hochfelder decision on the
standard of liability in enforcement actions must take into consideration
that the Court's ruling was limited in scope to private damages actions
under rule 1Ob-5. The Court explicitly left open the question whether
scienter would be required in an enforcement action. 88 Additionally, the
decision seemed to leave room for further judicial refinement of the exact
meaning of scienter by failing to address the issue of recklessness as a
82. Id.
83. Specifically, the Court examined sections 11, 12, and 15 of the 1933 Act, which
impose civil liability for false or misleading registration statements, prospectuses, or oral
communications relating to the sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1970). The
Court similarly looked at sections 9, 18, and 20 of the 1934 Act, which impose civil liability
for manipulation of securities prices and for false or misleading statements in any application, report, or document filed with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r, 78t (1970). See 425 U.S.
at 206-11.
84. 425 U.S. at 207. Section I I of the 1933 Act creates a private cause of action for a
false and misleading registration statement. Although issuers of securities using such a
registration statement are absolutely liable for resulting civil damages, experts such as
accountants or lawyers used in preparing the statement are accorded a "due diligence"
defense, which is comparable to a negligence standard of liability.
85. For example, in private damages actions under sections 1I, 12, and 15 of the 1933
Act, the court may require the plaintiff to post a bond for costs. Similarly, a one year statute
of limitations is made applicable to these provisions by section 13 of the 1933 Act.
86.
The Court posited that an extension of section 10(b) to include actions based on
negligent conduct "would allow causes of action covered by § 11, § 12(2), and § 15 of the
1933 Act, which are subject to procedural restrictions to be brought instead under § 10(b)
and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these
express actions." 425 U.S. at 210.
87. Id. at 214.
88. See note 10 supra.

substitute for scienter. 89 As a result, lower courts seeking to apply the
Hochfelder precedent to enforcement actions are initially confronted with
two unresolved issues: Is the Court's scienter analysis applicable to
enforcement actions? If it is to be applied, will a showing of reckless
disregard for the truth be sufficient to satisfy a scienter standard?
C.

Post-HochfelderInterpretations

Because the Hochfelder decision is of recent vintage and because the
vast majority of enforcement actions terminate in consent decrees prior to
final litigation on the merits, 90 few courts have confronted these issues.
Moreover, those courts interpreting the Hochfelder scienter standard in
the context of enforcement actions have rendered conflicting decisions.
In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 91 the District Court for Southern
New York 92 discarded the traditional distinctions between private damages actions and enforcement actions to require that the SEC plead and
prove scienter in enforcement actions under rule lOb-5. Relying on the
language 93 and legislative history94 analyses of the Hochfelder opinion,
the district court determined that neither the statutory language of section
10(b) nor the underlying legislative documents examined by the Hochfelder court evidences a congressional intent to set different standards of
liability for private damages actions and enforcement actions. 95 Section
10(b) does not expressly create a civil remedy for its violation, and there
is considerable evidence that a private cause of action was contemplated
by neither the drafters of section 10(b) 96 nor by the SEC when it adopted
rule lOb-5.9' Although private damages actions under rule lOb-5 are now
well established,9 8 such actions are judicially recognized on the basis of
89. The Court explicitly refused to take a position with respect to the sufficiency of
recklessness as a scienter substitute.
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional
conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here
the question of whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient
for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
90. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
91. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
92. The District Court for Southern New York bears the brunt of voluminous securities law litigation due to its geographical area of jurisdiction, which includes the corporate
financial hub of New York City. Consequently, both the district court and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals have achieved a judicially recognized degree of specialization in
securities litigation, which is accorded a certain deference and attention by other jurisdictions.
93. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
95. 420 F. Supp. at 1240-41.
96. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934); Note, Implied Liability Under
the Securities Exchange Act, 61 H~Av. L. REV. 858 (1948).
97. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952); SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
98. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977).

an implied statutory liability. 99 Consequently, the district court reasoned
that the Supreme Court's language and legislative hsitory analyses in
Hochfelder, a judicially implied form of action, must apply with equal
force to the enforcement action originally contemplated by the drafters of
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. As a result the court concluded that "the
identical standard under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 must be applied whether
the plaintiff is the SEC or a private litigant.' "l
In applying the Hochfelder rationale to enforcement actions, the
district court refused to draw on public policy considerations to distinguish enforcement actions from private damages actions. Observing that
only traditional public policy arguments could support a negligence
standard for enforcement actions and that the Hochfelder opinion explicitly refused to entertain such arguments in a private damages action,101
the district court similarly concluded that public policy considerations
were inapposite to a determination of the requisite standard of liability in
102
enforcement actions.
In SEC v. American Realty Trust, 103 the Eastern District of Virginia
followed the reasoning of the Bausch & Lomb court by declaring scienter
to be a necessary element in both enforcement and private damages
actions. 104 Additionally, the court broadened the Hochfelder scienter
requirement to include actions brought under Section 17 of the 1933
Act. 105
Application of the Hochfelder scienter standard to enforcement

actions has not met with universal acceptance. In SEC v. Universal
Major Industries Corp., 1o the Second Circuit declined to extend the
99. Probably the first judicial decision recognizing an implied civil liability under
section 10(b) is Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Since
Kardon, there has been a steady expansion of judicial recognition of private suits under
both section 10(b) and rule 101,-5. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), the Supreme Court characterized this expansion as follows: "When we deal with
private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn." Id. at 729-30. For a discussion and synopsis of the judicial
development of civil liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see North, Implied Liability
Cases Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 4 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 1 (1962).
100. 420 F. Supp. at 1243 n.4.
101. The Supreme Court stated, "As we find the language and history of § 10(b)
dispositive of the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine the
additional considerations of 'policy,' set forth by the parties .......
Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976).
102. 420 F. Supp. at 1241.
103. 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977).
104. The court stated, "If the language and history of 10(b) is dispositive as to a
scienter requirement in private actions, it must also be so for SEC enforcement actions,
since such suits are creatures of statute rather than implied rights of action." Id. at 1171.
105. The Court reasoned as follows:
Both antifraud provisions-§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and § 17 of the 1933 Actcontain almost identical language, a fact which even the SEC has admitted. ...
Both provisions have similar purposes. Accordingly the Court concludes that
scienter-an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud-is also a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief brought by the SEC pursuant to § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933.
Id.
106. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).

Hochfelder analysis to enforcement actions. Although the court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that the defendant-appellant
possessed the requisite degree of scienter required by Hochfelder for
private damages actions, dictum in the appellate court's opinion made it
clear that it did not believe the Hochfelder decision undermined the prior
case law of the circuit, 1°7 which established negligence as the proper
standard of liability in enforcement actions. 108
A similar decision was reached by the First Circuit in SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc. 109 Stressing the underlying difference in purpose
between a private suit and an enforcement action, the court stated,
From the standpoint of an SEC injunction against violations
which the court finds are likely to persist, a defendant's state of
mind is irrelevant. If proposed conduct is objectively within the
Congressional definition of injurious to the public, good faith,
however much it may be a defense to a private suit for past
actions [citations omitted], should make no difference. . . . An
injunction is designed to protect the public against conduct, not
to punish a state of mind.110
The same reasoning has been adopted in dictum by other courts in
enforcement actions decided subsequent to Hochfelder.111
D. Should Scienter Be Required in Enforcement Actions?
Notwithstanding the district court's use of the Hochfelder analysis in
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 112 to require a scienter standard in enforcement actions under rule 1Ob-5, it seems clear that Hochfelder does not
compel this result. While the Supreme Court did not consider public
policy considerations necessary for an analysis of scienter in private
damages actions" 3 these considerations are crucial to the determination
of a liability standard in enforcement actions. 114 When public policy is
considered, the overwhelming weight of judicial authority' 15 would apply
a traditional negligence standard to enforcement actions.
107. The Second Circuit has required a scienter standard for private suits under rule
lOb-5, but has consistently rejected scienter as a prerequisite for injunctive relief in enforcement actions. Compare, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) with SEC
v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974) and SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d
801 (2d Cir. 1975).
108. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
109. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
110. Id. at 540-41.
1I.
See SEC v. Geotek Resources Fund, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SEC
v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (although defendant showed
reckless disregard for truth sufficient to establish scienter, negligence alone is sufficient for
SEC injunctive relief); SEC v. Trans Jersey Bancorp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95818 (D.N.J. 1976) (although claim for monetary damages requires proof of scienter and
causation, such elements are not required in an SEC injunctive action).
112. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See notes 91-102 and accompanying text
supra.
113. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) (standards of public interest not the
requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief);
accord, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
115. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.

Enforcement actions are distinct from both criminal and civil litigation. In a criminal proceeding the public policy presumption of innocence
weighs the scales of justice heavily in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, the government must show a "willful" violation of the securites laws
by the defendant,'1 16 and, thus, evidence sufficient to sustain an enforcement action may fall short of supporting a criminal conviction. In a
private damages action the plaintiff properly bears a heavy burden of
proving scienter, since he is representing his own financial interests. In an
enforcement action, however, the SEC is acting in the public interest.
Because an enforcement action is uniquely different from both a criminal
proceeding and a private damages action, it should not automatically be
subject to the same burden of proof requirements.
Moreover, unlike either a criminal action or a private suit, an
enforcement action results in no stronger penalty than future compliance
with the securities laws. Neither civil penalty in the form of damages nor
criminal penalty in the form of fines and/or imprisonment is imposed,
although violation of an injunctive decree may result in civil or criminal
contempt proceedings. 117 Even when some form of ancillary relief is
authorized, "8 it is imposed only to give effect to the remedial purposes of
the statute and not to penalize or punish the defendant. 19
Another factor militating against extension of the Hochfelder scienter standard to enforcement actions is the effect that such an extension is
likely to have on the consent decree process. An indirect but important
advantage of the enforcement action lies in its use as a bargaining lever in
encouraging potential defendants to enter into informal negotiations that
result in consent judgments. 120 By requiring the SEC to assume the
onerous burden of proving scienter in an enforcement action, courts will
weaken the SEC's bargaining position by encouraging potential defendants to go to the litigational mat in the belief that the SEC will be unable
to meet the requirement.
Finally, in determining the applicability of the scienter requirement
to enforcement actions, the Hochfelder decision should be interpreted as
the latest in a continuing series of Supreme Court opinions evidencing a
judicial trend toward confining the proliferation of securities litigation 12 1
116. See note 31 and accompanying text supra,
117. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) (criminal contempt);
Penfield Co. of California v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947) (civil contempt).
118. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.
119. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1971); SEC v.
Beisinger Indus. Corp., 421 F. Supp. 691 (D. Mass. 1976).
120. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
121. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (requiring
purchaser-seller status by a private plaintiff to recover damages under rule 1Ob-5); Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (requiring showing of irreparable injury and
inadequacy of legal remedy for private plaintiff seeking civil injunction under 13(d) of the
1934 Act); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053

and toward reducing the increasing workload of the federal judiciary by
limiting access of private litigants to the federal courts.12 2 Yet, decisions
within this trend have clearly differentiated federal enforcement agencies
from private litigants. In Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrug Stores, 123 for
example, the Supreme Court restricted the availability of a rule 1Ob-5
civil remedy by requiring that the private plaintiff be a purchaser or seller
of securities in connection with the allegedly unlawful conduct of the
defendant. 124 The Court, however, affirmed an earlier opinion, 125 declaring that no such limitation is imposed on the SEC in an enforcement
action.126 The Hochfelder Court's explicit refusal to include enforcement
actions within the scope of its scienter formulation provides an implicit
indication that the Court's rationale should be restricted to private damages action under rule lOb-5.
IV.

The Meaning of Scienter

A.

Scienter Prior to Hochfelder
The second problem facing courts that apply the Hochfelder scienter
standard to enforcement actions is defining the type of conduct necessary
to demonstrate scienter by the defendant. Although some form of scienter
was required by most circuit courts prior to Hochfelder, 127 the precise
nature of the conduct embraced by the term scienter has been shrouded in
semantic confusion. 2 8 Indeed, there are almost as many formulations of
the meaning of scienter as there are judicial decisions employing the
term.' 2 9 Traditionally, scienter encompasses the following four elements
(1977) (restricting lOb-5 liability for insider trading on open market when no direct reliance
can be shown by plaintiff).
122. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash., 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (denying an implied civil cause of action
to prohibit illegal campaign contributions); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (limiting awarding of attorneys' fees in private suits to enforce
remedial statutes).
123. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
124. By imposing a purchaser-seller requirement, the Court affirmed the "Birnbaum
Doctrine" of the landmark decision of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In that decision the court dismissed the plaintiff's
private suit under rule lOb-5 for lack of standing, since plaintiff had not actually purchased
or sold securities.
125. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), the Court held that the
purchaser-seller rule imposed no limitation on the SEC in bringing enforcement actions for
injunctive relief.
126. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 n.14 (1975).
127. See note 9 supra.
128. This judicial confusion has prompted one commentator to state, "Probably the
most important step toward clarifying the law of scienter would be to ban the word." 2 A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD SEC RULE lOb-5, § 8.4, at 503 (Supp. 1971)[hereinafter
cited as A. BROMBERG].

129. The scienter terminology has been judicially construed to include conduct ranging
from ordinary negligence to willful fraud. See Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448
F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971) (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion) (recklessness
equivalent to willful fraud); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) (common-law
fraud not required); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (proof of
fraud necessary to establish scienter).

of fraudulent intent: (1) that a representation be made, (2) that it convey a
particular meaning, (3) that it be believed, and (4) that it be acted upon in
a certain manner. 131 In the early case of Derry v. Peek, 131 an English
court held that "fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3)
recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." 13 2 This classic commonlaw formulation has been adapted to securities litigation to establish
scienter based on the defendant's knowledge, state of mind, or degree of
133
care in making a misleading statement or omission.
The knowledge criterion is the most widely used of the three bases
and the standard favored by many commentators. 134 As it has judicially
evolved in rule lOb-5 litigation, knowledge has come to mean either
actual knowledge by the defendant that a statement is misleading or
knowledge of the existence of facts which, if disclosed, would have
shown the statement or omission to be misleading.1 35 Many courts have
extended the knowledge criterion to include "constructive knowledge"-i.e., knowledge of the misleading nature of a statement or
omission that is imputed from the factual data available to the defendant
1 36
at the time.
In contrast to the objective knowledge criterion, the state of mind
criterion requires subjective inquiry into the defendant's motive, purpose,
or intent in making the misleading statement or omission. Although this is
the strictest of the scienter criteria, some courts have inferred intent to
deceive from a showing of actual or constructive knowledge of facts
indicating the misleading nature of the statement or omission. 137 Moreover, the state of mind criterion is sometimes presented as an alternative
form of scienter proof to be used in conjunction with knowledge or care
criteria. 138
130.
131.
132.

W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 700 (4th ed. 1971).
14 A.C. 337 (1889).
Id. at 374.

133. In addition to the three broad common-law criteria for establishing scienter,
Professor Bromberg refines the degrees within each category as follows:
Knowledge criteria
Actual knowledge
Constructive knowledge
State of mind criteria
Intent
Purpose or motive
Bad faith
Care Criteria
Recklessness
Negligence
A. BROMBERG, supra note 128, at 504.
134. See, e.g., id.; Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562 (1972);
Comment, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969).

135.

See, e.g., Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoads, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974); McLean v.

Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).

136. See Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973); Hert v. Weitzen, 402
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1965).
137. See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962)
(intent to deceive may be inferred from knowledge).
138.

See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).

The care criterion comes closest to the traditional negligence standard of liability. Many courts unwilling to allow recovery in private suits
for "mere negligence" nevertheless impose liability when the defendant's conduct amounts to a reckless disregard for the truth. 13 9 Although
recklessness in the context of securities litigation has not been very
clearly defined, it has generally included conduct falling short of a fully
formed intent to deceive, yet amounting to more than ordinary negligence. t40
B.

The Meaning of Scienter in Hochfelder

It is from this confusing range of scienter formulations that the
Supreme Court fashioned its scienter requirement for private damages
actions under rule 1Ob-5. The Hochfelder definition of scienter-'"men' 141 _
tal state embracing an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud
contributes little to the refinement of the degree of culpability required.
By adopting the most restrictive of the three traditional scienter criteria,
the Supreme Court mandated an admittedly confused judicial standard
while failing to provide the conceptual tools necessary for its further
refinement in the lower courts.
The Hochfelder opinion added a further element of confusion by
refusing to eliminate recklessness as an adequate substitute for scienter. 142 As might be expected, this has created an interpretational split in
the lower courts. The Southern District of New York, which now seems
to require scienter in enforcement actions,1 43 has determined that only
139. See id.; Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971);
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
140. One court has formulated the meaning of recklessness in the context of rule lOb-5
litigation as follows:
In determining was [sic] constitutes "willful or reckless disregard for the truth"
the inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defendants knew the
material facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on notice
of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise themselves of the facts
where they could have done so without any extraordinary effort.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d Cir. 1973).
A more recent interpretation of the meaning of recklessness in post-Hochfeldersecurities litigation relies on the more restrictive state of mind criterion. In Franks v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Development Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976), the court defined
reckless conduct as "a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." Id. at 725. This interpretation
has been termed a "functional equivalent of intent" by one court. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., 533 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
141. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
142. The Hochfelder Court stated,
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional
conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here
the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5.
Id. at 194 n.12.
143. While the Bausch & Lomb decision explicitly required scienter in an SEC enforcement action, see notes 89-103 and accompanying text supra, that result has been put in
doubt by a recent decision handed down by a different panel of the district court. In SEC v.

recklessness equivalent to willful fraud is sufficient to satisfy the scienter
requirement. 44 Other courts, however, have determined that recklessness
145
equivalent to knowledge will suffice.
A similar divergence of opinion is reflected in recent lower court
decisions in private damages actions brought under rule lOb-5. Some
courts that require strict adherence to the state of mind criterion established in Hochfelder have held recklessness insufficient to demonstrate
scienter.6 Other courts have accepted recklessness as a scienter substitute, but have differed over what constitutes reckless behavior.1 47
C.

Meaning of Scienter in Enforcement Actions
Although the state of mind criterion for establishing scienter has
been mandated by Hochfielder in private damages actions, it does not
necessarily follow that the same criterion must be applied in an enforcement context. 148 The opinion itself left ample room for the development
E.L. Aaron & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the
defendant relied on the Bausch & Lomb precedent to argue that the SEC must establish
scienter as part of its burden of proof in an enforcement action. The court countered,
Hochfelder only passed upon a private suit for damages in a § 10(b) context and
not upon Commission injunctive actions under § 5. The law of this Circuit is that
negligence, and not scienter, is all that is required in a Commission injunctive
proceeding under § 5. [citing Universal Major Indus. opinion of the Second
Circuit]. However, even if scienter were required, defendants acted with knowledge or reckless disregard of the illegality of the arrangement.
Id. at 91,686.
144. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1242-43 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
This interpretation has been specifically endorsed in a recent decision of the District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia. In SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148
(E.D. Va. 1977) the court stated,
The Supreme Court's emphasis that scienter means to deceive leads this Court to
agree with the conclusion, reached by the District Court in Bausch & Lomb,
supra, that "only what Judge Friendly has characterized as 'the kind of recklessness that is equivalent to willful fraud' [citation omitted] will serve as a basis for
liability."
One decision subsequent to Hochfelder, McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057
(D. Del. 1976), has indicated that knowing conduct is to be equated with scienter,
but this Court declines to follow that decision.
Id. at 1171 n.8.
145. See, e.g., SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (see note 143 supra); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225
(E.D.N.Y. 1976).
146. See Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977) (willful
or intentional misconduct or the equivalent thereof essential to recovery); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976) (specific intent to defraud satisfying Hochfelder
scienter requirement); Franks v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development Auth., 428 F. Supp.
719 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (conscious fault or actual knowledge necessary).
147. Compare Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (private
suit dismissed when no intent or recklessness equivalent to fraud shown) and Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (recklessness
equivalent to willful fraud sufficient) with Peltz v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 382
(N.D. Ohio 1977) (actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth) and McLean v.
Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976) (little reason to distinguish between knowing
misbehavior and reckless misbehavior).
148. But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In dissenting to the majority imposition of a scienter standard for private suits,
Mr. Justice Blackmun stated,
[T]he question whether negligent conduct violates the Rule should not depend
upon the plaintiff's identity. If negligence is a violation factor when the SEC sues,
it must be a violation factor when a private party sues.

of a less restrictive formulation of scienter in enforcement actions by
injecting the element of recklessness as a substitute for scienter. Moreover, existing case law has always recognized inherent differences between
private damages and enforcement actions,149 and therefore supports development of a separate scienter meaning in the latter.
Many of the same considerations that militate against imposition of a
scienter standard in enforcement actions argue just as persuasively against
interpreting such a standard restrictively. Because the enforcement action
is remedial rather than punitive, a less restrictive scienter formulation is
warranted. The public interest in SEC enforcement of securities laws
requires flexible interpretation of burden of proof formulations to effect
the remedial purposes of these statutes. 150 Moreover, the SEC's administrative ability to enforce violations of the securities laws through the
consent decree process would be jeopardized if a defendant thinks it
unlikely that the SEC will be able to meet the burden of a technically
restrictive scienter formulation.
Thus, in the context of enforcement actions, scienter should assume
a more comprehensive meaning than in private suits. Rather than being
restricted to a subjective intent to deceive, scienter should also comprise
knowledge by a defendant that his conduct is misleading and conduct that
amounts to a reckless disregard for the truth. By interpreting scienter as
either actual knowledge or recklessness for purposes of enforcement
actions, courts will provide the flexible framework necessary for effective
enforcement of the securities laws.
V.

Conclusion

As the administrative agency charged with the enforcement of the
securities laws, the SEC has a broad range of remedial options. One of
the most effective and often used of these remedies is the enforcement
action to enjoin future violations of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. Prior to
the Supreme Court's Hochfelder decision, negligence rather than scienter
was the judicially accepted standard of liability in enforcement actions.
Any extension of the scienter requirement to enforcement actions flies in
the face of a judicially recognized public interest in effective enforcement
of securities laws.
Even if the Hochfelder scienter standard is to be applied to enforcement actions, the meaning of scienter should be expanded beyond the
restrictive state of mind criteria enunciated by the Hochfelder court for
private suits. The Hochfelder decision's definitional ambiguity regarding
Id. at 216. One court has used this reasoning to require scienter in enforcement actions since
that standard is required in private suits. See SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp.
1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1977).
149. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
150. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).

the sufficiency of recklessness as a substitute for intentional deception
leaves ample room for an interpretation that scienter includes conduct that
the defendant knows to be misleading or that flows from reckless disregard for the truth. Such a construction is essential to assure judicial
flexibility in furthering the remedial purposes of the securities laws in
enforcement actions.
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